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Article Title: The Birth, Adjustment, and Death of States 
  
Abstract 
The article proposes Erection, Adjustment, and Death mechanisms for governmental units, giving 
autonomy to each citizen as in a direct democracy. Rather than focusing on a narrow model with 
restrictive and specialized assumptions, and subsequent solutions, as has been common in the 
literature, the article takes citizens seriously acknowledging that they are best equipped to find their 
own solutions. The emphasis is on the practical approach of how citizens discover and implement 
their subjective preferences. Governmental units are subjected to some of the same market forces as 
ordinary firms, in the spirit of Coase (1988). This brings the interaction between governmental units 
























Increasing globalization and concomitant flows of citizens, goods, services, and capital across 
borders at the superstate, state, regional, and local levels make the regulation or non-regulation of 
birth, adjustment, and death of states and local territorial governmental units especially relevant. The 
history of international political and constitutional economy has traditionally assumed borders as 
exogenously given, despite the fact that borders are continuously redrawn through a variety of 
mechanisms. 
 
At the turn of the millennium a literature is gradually emerging
1 which accounts, in the tradition of 
recent trends within economic theory,
2 for the endogenous determination of borders. It can be 
suggested that the  literature can be tentatively or stereotypically divided into an “American” 
approach and a “European” approach.
3 The American approach, starting with Tiebout (1956), 
recognizes the importance of competitive units at the local level, and focuses, in the spirit of 
Buchanan and Faith (1987), on a competitive structure’s ability to optimize local governmental 
services and taxes. Extensions are made by Alesina and Spolaore (1997), Glomm and Lagunoff 
(1998), Casella (2001ab).
4 In contrast, the European approach centers on trade between nations, 
and optimization of the number of nations in a trading context. Examples are Bolton and Roland 
(1997) and Bolton et al. (1996). 
 
A common result is that democratization leads to secessions which, together with international 
economic integration, imply inefficiently many countries (Alesina and Spolaore 1997). Similarly, 
Casella (2001b:83) argues that “the optimal number of jurisdictions is unique and increases with 
market size.” Bolton and Roland (1997:1057) argue that “separation occurs in equilibrium” “when 
income distributions vary across regions and the efficiency gains from unification are small,” but that 
“all incentives for separation disappear” “when all factors of production are perfectly mobile.” One 
deficiency of Bolton and Roland’s (1997:1057) result is the assumption that welfare is maximized 
                                                                 
1 In somewhat earlier analyses, analyzing the size of nations, Wittman (1991) argues that wealth maximization is 
determinative. Friedman (1977) shows that nations are shaped to maximize joint revenue, net of collection costs, 
and that trade should imply large nations, rent should imply small nations, and labor should imply that nations 
will have closed boundaries or be culturally homogeneous. 
2 See Hausken (2000) for a treatment of how group size is determined endogenously by intergroup migration. 
3 This division refers more to funders of research than to where researchers are geographically located. 
4 See Dowding et al. (1994) for a survey of the empirical Tiebout literature, pointing out that Tiebout is quoted in 
more than 1000 papers. See John et al. (1995) for a micro-level test of the behavioral assumptions of the Tiebout  
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when the median voter’s tax preferences are satisfied (majority voting). In the absence of unanimity 
there is no guarantee that this is the case, as shown by Wicksell (1896) and Buchanan and Tullock 
(1962).
5 Results of these and similar kinds will continue to emerge from this literature, generating a 
web of models. To allow for analytical tractability and sufficiently specific results, restrictive or 
specialized assumptions typically have to be made, often combined with a narrow focus. As Levins 
(1966,1985) suggests with respect to model building, “truth is the intersection of multiple lies.” Care 
should be exercised when drawing conclusions from the specialized models that emerge. 
 
An unfortunate side effect of the analytical approach is that the focus on a mathematical solution 
implementable by social economists takes attention away from the more practical approach of how 
to discover and implement the subjective preferences of the citizens. For a majority of citizens 
subjective preferences and beliefs are often not known or not explicitly verbalized. Even when 
known and verbalized, subjective preferences and beliefs are often not available quantitatively for 
mathematical treatment. Assuming we could construct a complete preference schedule for all 
citizens, incorporating future innovations in technology and organization would be difficult. (If we 
knew about them, they wouldn’t be innovations.) Rigorous analytical models thus frequently lack the 
flexibility needed to accommodate innovations. This may lead to less adaptation and expression of 
new innovations, and hence lower growth over time. While in the study of a particular market, 
mathematical models are useful tools in as far as they may allow predicting market action, they may 
become impediments to change from the moment they are used to prescribe the actions of individual 
agents.  
 
Neither the American nor European approaches have focused much on what is empirically the most 
important reasons for state erection; social, cultural, religious and ethnic issues. Lacking is also the 
obvious welfare benefits like less war, revolution, etc. associated with lower barriers to entry. The 
focus on narrowly defined economic utility inadequately accounts for utility which is difficult to 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
model.  
5 Unanimity takes on a special role in Wicksell’s (1896) treatment, highly influential on Buchanan and Tullock 
(1962). Buchanan translated Wicksell to English, Buchanan and Tullock (1962) devoting considerable portions of 
their book to unanimity, Pareto optimality and decision making rules. Note that what Bolton and Roland 
(1997:1079) in a normative statement call the ”damaging effects of fiscal competition” and “inefficiencies of fiscal 
competition” does tend to increase the effective majority behind a particular level of taxation, which may assure a 
more Pareto optimal structure. I.e., while 50% of the population favors a tax rate of 30%, 90% of the population 
may favor a rate of 10%. Thus lower taxes may bring us closer to unanimity, and hence a more optimal solution.   
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measure. Frey et al. (2001) attempt to remedy this by process utility in addition to outcome utility, 
demonstrating empirically that “reported subjective well-being of the population is much higher in 
jurisdictions with stronger direct democratic rights.” I.e., utility is derived from the political process 
itself. 
  
The purpose of this article is to propose mechanisms designed to reduce the costs associated with 
1) the erection of governmental units, 2) the adjustment of unit borders, and 3) the possible death of 
units. The article suggests that optima can only be achieved through the inclusion of the citizens in the 
decision making process. Given the proper decision making procedures and institutional framework, 
there is no necessary conflict, as has been claimed, between democracy and the optimum size of a 
governmental unit. The approach is firmly embedded in the economic tradition, but has a broad 
rather than narrow focus, and avoids making restrictive and specialized assumptions. The focus is 
thus on the operative side of the mechanisms, and not on the solutions which abound in the literature 
(based on a narrow focus with restrictive and specialized assumptions). The autonomy is thus 
allocated down to the individual citizen, who is best equipped to find his preferred solution. 
 
Section 2 provides the common characteristics of the present (i.e. today’s) constitutional model, 
with disadvantages in section 3. Section 4 provides an alternative constitutional model, with 
advantages and limitations in section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2 The present constitutional model 
Although the present (i.e. today’s) constitutional models vary considerably across territories and 
governmental levels, this section attempts to extract certain archetypical and possibly stereotypical 
characteristics that are common and provide a benchmark for comparison with the alternative 
constitutional model proposed in section 4. Even for a reader disagreeing with some of the 
description and disadvantages in sections 2 and 3, insight may be gained by comparison with 
sections 3 and 4. 
 
Definition 1. The term unit denotes any territorial unit or area at the local, regional, or global level, 
with its associated governmental functions and associated citizens. Examples are local communes, 
towns, cities, counties, regions, other regional governmnental bodies, states, countries, nations, and  
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certain supernational governmental units (e.g. EU), etc. 
6 
 
Definition 2. The size of a unit refers to both its geographical size and the number of citizens within its 
borders. 
 
We consider a given level (local, regional, global) with N units and n i citizens associated with unit i, 
i=1,…,N. At this level we thus get a profile of [n1,n2,…,nN] citizens across the N units. 
 
The present constitutional model reveals a variety of mechanisms for  
1.  birth, adjustment, and death of units. A new unit may be erected by local government 
reorganization initiated by a central authority, and m ore importantly in a state context; 
“liberation”, war, revolution, violent partition or UN Resolution. Formerly, colonization of 
newly discovered uninhabited territories was important, as was the peaceful erection of new 
states in the USA. A unit may go extinct by losing a war (extinguished from without) or by 
revolution (extinguished from within). In a nation state or country context most births and 
deaths of territorial units take place in a context of violence and coercion. 
2.  exit (emigration) and entry (immigration) of people (citizens and non-citizens). 
3.  electing or not electing government. 
4.  governmental or collective decision making. 
 
The present constitutional model lacks mechanisms for 
1.  resource mobility for physical resources connected to land. 
 
3 Disadvantages of the present constitutional model 
We distinguish between the temporary direct disadvantages of the present mechanisms associated 
with the methods for the creation, destruction, and altering of units, and various permanent or semi-
permanent indirect disadvantages caused by the lack of competition between units.  
1.  Present mechanisms rely to a large extent on coercion and violence, with substantial human 
and material loss in  the creation, destruction, altering of boundaries, and also change of 
                                                                 
6 Governmental units without a territory are not included in the discussion, see Frey (2001). As a practical matter 





2.  Many units do not have the kind of governmental, legal or social institutions that the 
population wants. 
3.  Many units do not efficiently provide the population with the services it wants, i.e. resources 
are squandered and growth hampered by a dysfunctional (e.g. large and inefficient) public 
sector.
8 
4.  Many units have a consistent majority/minority issue due to ethnic, religious or other factors.  
5.  The artificially determined sizes and boundaries of units cause unit dysfunctionality. 
6.  Artificially d etermined exit and entry barriers, often combined with the “tyranny” of the 
majority over the minority, causes at least some citizens to be located in a unit against their 
will. 
7.  Present mechanisms often cause the emergence and/or continuance of units which are either 
dysfunctionally large or small with respect to geographical dispersion or the numbers of 
citizens within their borders.
9 
8.  Unit size is not presently dynamic so innovations in organization or technology are not 
reflected in changes to unit size and organization.
10 
9.  The prevalence of rent seeking often incurs costs equaling or superceding the value of the 
rent (Krueger 1974, Posner 1975, Tullock 1980). There is widespread rent seeking among 
groups within units and also cross-border rent seeking, e.g. where units try to tax activities 
beyond their own borders.
11 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
the use of force within its territory. 
7 The total number of people dying from war in the 20
th century equaled 10% of the world population in 1913. 
While it is clear that war and violent revolution reduce the general welfare immeasurably in the short term, the 
fact that these hardships are tolerated points to important perceived welfare benefits in the long term. To put it 
simply, if there hadn’t been important perceived long-term benefits, there wouldn’t have been so many wars, 
uprisings and revolutions. 
8 The public sector controls about 37% of GDP (tax revenues as % of GDP, 1998 figures from OECD website) in 
OECD countries and has significantly lower productivity growth (in some cases negative) than the rest of the 
economy.  
9 In the US with its relatively homogenous culture there is a very significant size difference between Rhode Island 
and California. Even though we do not know the “optimal” state size, the current span in units with similar 
functions and organization suggests that there may be room for optimization. 
10 It may ease the understanding of this issue to consider that many state borders in the Eastern part of the 
United States have remained essentially unchanged for more than 200 years. Even assuming that borders were 
optimal at the time they came into existence, it is reasonable that not all of them are optimal today taking into 
account the considerable changes in technology the last 200 years. 
11 Many countries, the U.S. included, tax their citizens on worldwide income independent of their residence and 
the source of the income.  
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10. The lack of resource mobility between units is dysfunctional related to rent seeking
12 and for 
other reasons. Even though financial assets may move quite freely between units, the most 
important real factors are severely restricted in their mobility. The two most important 
examples are 1) land, including the natural and man-made resources associated with the land 
(oil and gas resources, ores, minerals, timber, agricultural products, factories, buildings, 
mines, residential housing etc.) and 2) people. Land in general “moves” only by war, and 
people mobility is restricted by natural, cultural, social, and institutional barriers.
13 
11. Although collective action has advantages, e.g. lower cost than the market price for certain 
activities, there are also disadvantages, as the literature has demonstrated. Even with 
democracy, there are still issues related to collective decision making that are unavoidable. 
Although representative democracy with majority decision making of some sort in many 
respects is superior to e.g. dictatorial decision making, there are imperfections related to the 
recording of each citizen’s preference function and methodological issues related to the 
weighing of each citizen’s function with respect to all other citizens in the collective 
preventing the achievement of a clearcut optimal solution.
14 
 
4 An alternative constitutional model 
The critique of mathematical models in the introduction does not mean that this section succumbs or 
acquiesces to a non-specific, qualitative, or sociological alternative constitutional model. Quite the 
                                                                 
12 Caplan (2001) has shown that when borders are set exogenously, it is possible even for local governmental 
units to extract significant rent from citizens through property taxation. Caplan’s (2001:101) conclusion is that 
“the only check on local governments comes through imperfectly functioning electoral channels.” If borders are 
not exogenous, as is the case in this article, the rent extraction indicated by Caplan is no longer possible since 
citizens can exit together with their real property (housing). 
13 Examples limiting people mobility are immigration law, language barriers and lack of cross-border skill 
recognition. If e.g. a Frenchman is dissatisfied with his government’s policies and wants to move, he has to deal 
with more commuting or abandonment of contact with friends and family, most likely a new language (e.g. 
Spanish, English or German), a new social code requiring possibly years of effort to gain new social skills 
appropriate to his new abode, having to find a new place to live and work involving large transaction costs, and 
much time and effort with the task of just finding his way about his new place of residence. As the US has few 
formal internal barriers to the movement of people, and as academics are given highly preferential treatment in 
most countries’ immigration law, share a common language (English) and to a large extent a common culture, the 
substantial real and mental barriers to general people mobility may not be fully appreciated. It is easy to confuse 
one’s own position within asmall economic and intellectual elite (perhaps 0,5% on a worldwide basis) with that of 
the general public. 
14 One example is that the majority gets its way and the minority loses out. Another example is e.g. the problem of 
cyclic majorities described by Black (Black 1958) and Condorcet. Consider a three-person village using majority 
voting as a means of ranking each pair of alternatives. A clear-cut social ordering need not emerge. If Ann’s 
preferences are I,II,III, Ben’s are II,III,I, and Bill’s are III,I,II, then, in pairwise votes, I beats II, II beats III, and III 
beats I.  
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contrary; the proposal falls firmly within the economic tradition where each citizen maximizes his own 
welfare, but he does so in a manner where preferences and beliefs are not given in the traditional 
economic sense. Preferences and beliefs are partly and differentially known to the citizens, and they 
engage in bounded rationality and trial and error in attempts to increase welfare.
15 We recognize that 
it is never possible to fully know every citizen’s set of preferences, i.e. omniscience is impossible.
16 
Thus our task is not to prescribe each citizen’s actions, but rather to help each citizen express his 
preferences in a more efficient manner. 
 
Most units today do not have formal mechanisms for the creation, destruction, altering of 
boundaries, and change of function of units. Instead many units (e.g. states) are assumed to exist 
unchanged for eternity. There may be benefits of loosening up this rigid structure, e.g. by introducing 
the following Erection Mechanism




Erection Mechanism (Assumptions 1 and 2): 
Assumption 1. Each citizen has the right, in collaboration with that subset of the N citizens resident 
within the boundaries of  a proposed unit, to erect a new unit either within the boundaries of an 
existing unit, or by the amalgamation of two or more units or parts of units. 
                                                                 
15 Elster (1983) distinguishes between the “thin theory of individual rationality” (where preferences and beliefs 
are given) and the “broad theory of individual rationality” (looking at how preferences and beliefs are shaped, 
through judgment and satisficing). There exists much literature on this subject outside the scope of this article, 
initiated by Simon’s (1955) argument that man has limited capacity for processing information and preferences. 
16 Assuming quantitatively given and one-dimensional preferences, Alesina and Spolaore’s (1997:1030) model 
assumes that “the world population has mass 1, and we assume a continuum of individuals with ideal points 
distributed uniformly on the segment [0,1].” In contrast, we assume neither quantitative and one-dimensional 
preferences, nor specific citizens distributions. 
17 The Erection Mechanism functions through a self defining referendum thereby eliminating the need for apriori 
judgments, i.e. judgments external to the model itself, about the necessity of unit erection, the proposed borders, 
etc. A priori judgments, unfortunately, depend on the opinions, wisdom, knowledge, and the inherent biases of 
those individuals or that group making the judgment.  
18 Assumptions 1 and 2 are fundamental, and may by themselves imply 3 and 4 since any single citizen may 
achieve 3 and 4 by going via 1 and 2. However, we prefer to set up Assumptions 3 and 4 explicitly, as a shortcut, 
since the indirect implication is more cumbersome for the citizens and thus involves higher costs. Also note that 
1 and 2 presuppose collective action (even though N may be 1), while 3 and 4 are related to individual decisions. 
Collective action involving any number of possibly conflicting proposals and any number of decision makers 
rapidly increases complexity and may not have an easily agreed upon optimum solution (Black 1958). This article 
argues, however, that it is more important that there is a solution rather than whether or not it is the “optimum” 
solution. The reason for this relative lack of concern for reaching an optimum unit size (in terms of population 
and geographical extent) at the first iteration has to do with the self adjustment that may take place afterwards 
through the Adjustment Mechanism or, in a more cumbersome fashion, through repeated applications of the 
Erection Mechanism. 





Assumption 2. Any citizen qualified to vote may sponsor a draft proposal for the erection of a new 
unit. The draft shall describe the boundaries of the proposed new unit, which must be a territorial 
unit and thus have a size at least marginally larger than zero. 
 
Adjustment Mechanism (Assumptions 3 and 4): 
Assumption 3. Each citizen has the right to leave or to transit
20 through any unit and bring with him 
property of any kind.
21 
 
Assumption 4. Each citizen has the right to withdraw from any unit's territory any of his non-
contested real estate that has been accepted by another unit or retain his existing citizenship and the 
territorial affiliation of his non-contested real estate in the case of erection of a new unit. 
 
Death Mechanism (Assumption 5): 
Assumption 5. A unit must have a non-zero territorial extent, and dies otherwise.  
 
The Erection mechanism is  a considerable transition toward individual freedom and direct 
democracy. Assumption 1 lets each individual choose where to be a citizen. Assumption 2 allows 
each individual to take the initiative to erect a new unit. Requiring unit size at least marginally larger 
than zero is done to rule out units without territory (treated by Frey 2001), and to ensure that each 
citizen has a location to “place his feet”. The Adjustment mechanism is a considerable transition 
toward freedom of movement. Assumption 3 provides the usual personal exit mechanism, but 
includes “property of any kind”, i.e. both movable and immovable property (real property or real 
estate). Assumption 4 clarifies what is meant by the “movement” of real property and provides a 
mechanism that is independent of the actual movement of the physical person, i.e. a citizen’s 
property may move even though the citizen stays put. For the purpose of Assumptions 3 and 4, real 
estate is meant to include any other property interests associated with real estate, i.e. not only the 
land and buildings themselves, but also ores and minerals located below ground, or timber and 
                                                                 
20 Transit is relevant in terms of practical implementation of the model, e.g. when proceeding from one unit to 
another requires passing through a third unit. 
21 Property includes real property i.e. land and property associated with land (buildings etc.) which, through re-
drawing borders, can be transferred to another unit.  
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agricultural products located above ground.
22 The Death mechanism in Assumption 5 allows units to 
die. Note that even though property does not have citizens residing on it, it may still be owned by 
somebody. E.g., a factory may be empty at night, can it be claimed? Furthermore, even if all citizens 
leave a unit temporarily, it may still be owned by someone. 
 
To see how the Erection, Adjustment, and Death mechanisms operate in praxis, consider the 
following statement by the 1991 Nobel prize winner Coase (1988:117): 
“The government is, in a sense, a super-firm (but of a very special kind) since it is able to influence the use 
of factors of productions by administrative decision. But the ordinary firm is subject to checks in its 
operations because of the competition of other firms which might administer the same activities at lower 
cost, and also because there is always the alternative of market transactions against organization within 
the firm if the administrative costs become too great.”  
 
In Coase’s spirit, the proposed remedy of this article is to subject units to some of the same market 
forces as ordinary firms. The expectation is that this will materially lower the cost of government, or 
what amounts to the same thing, increase the benefits or welfare associated with governmental units. 
However, the definition of costs and benefits is much broader than Coase’s. I.e., we include not 
only the tangibles measurable by income, gross domestic product and the like, but also the more 
difficult to measure intangibles like lack of coercion, peace, subjective happiness, etc. 
 
The utility or welfare u for each citizen in a given unit
23, defined as benefits minus costs, can be 
defined as 
 
(,,,,,), uugsoprt =   (1) 
where 
g=geography (size, shape, etc of unit) 
s=Social factors (language, ethniticity, religion etc.) 
o=politics, social organization and legal system 
                                                                 
22 The Erection and Adjustment mechanisms tie together citizens and real property owners. Citizens decide 
whether to erect a new unit, but they must obtain the consent of at least one property owner as we are dealing 
with territorial units. From a practical point of view the sponsors of a proposal to erect a new unit may 
contingently contract with a property owner to purchase one unit of real property upon the erection of a new 
unit. 
23 The collective welfare function is a pure aggregate of the individual welfare functions, and is thus determined  
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p=population of unit 
r=resources, natural and man-made available to unit 
t=technology or knowledge available to unit 
 
The welfare function u has several important characteristics. First, it consists of many variables. The 
exact number will vary from case to case as any individual variable may be fixed (constant) for some 
units and variable for others. Additionally, there is no immediate and clear distinction between 
benefits and costs. E.g., particular values for social factors may be subjectively perceived as benefits 
by some citizens, and perceived as costs  by other citizens. (In general whether any particular 
quantity is a cost or benefit depends on where we take our reference level, 0-level, to be.) If units 
are relatively large in terms of population and geographical size, each citizen’s decision as to which 
unit to adhere to has only negligible impact on the character of the unit itself.
24 Thus we have a 
market-like structure, provided that transaction costs of all kinds (including discovery costs, decision 
making costs, etc.) are relatively low, which it i s the purpose of the Erection  Mechanism and 
Adjustment Mechanism to provide. This article does not propose to abolish government. Thus the 
benefits of administrative decisions noted by Coase will still be available to the extent that the costs 
in the aggregate are lower than what may be obtained in the market. 
 
5 Advantages of the alternative constitutional model with limitations 
The advantages of the Erection Mechanism and Adjustment Mechanism are as follows: 
1.  All decision making is delegated down to each autonomous citizen where no majority voting 
allows for the “tyranny” of the majority over the minority. 
2.  The absence of exit and entry barriers causes sizes of units to be optimally adjusted as each 
citizen maximizes his welfare. This self-adjustment feature has many advantages. 
3.  Although there are differences in the impediments to the creation and destruction of units, and 
although violence may play a role, this article suggests that benefits may be realized by lowering 
those many and diverse barriers to entry that do exist. 
4.  The benefits of loosening up the rigid structure in sections 2 and 3 may be of the quantifiable 
kind, e.g. better services at a lower cost, and thus better operational resource utilization. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
by the same variables. 
24 As is always the case, if the number of participants is low, we no longer have a marketlike structure.  
 
13
5.  The benefits may also be of the less easily quantifiable kind, e.g. better allocation of resources in 
the sense of more closely adhering to the subjective preferences of the citizens. 
6.  If the end result of the present mechanisms described in sections 2 and 3, and the Erection 
Mechanism and Adjustment Mechanism is the same, e.g. a new unit, substantial welfare benefits 
and other benefits may be gained by having the issue settled peacefully rather than violently. 
7.  Even if the end result is not the same, e.g. because the alternative constitutional model allows for 
the erection of units that would not have been created otherwise or for the non-erection
25 of 
units that would have been erected through a more violent method (certainly not a very common 
occurrence), there may still be welfare benefits. Such benefits arise from the rational behavior 
hypothesis where one of the postulates is that more choice is preferable to less choice.
26 Recent 
econometric results by Frey et al. (2001:2) support the hypothesis that more choice, from the 
citizen’s point of view, is better than less choice. I.e., there may be benefits associated with the 
process itself, referred to by Frey et al. (2001) as process utility, quite independent of the final 
result. Even without evident benefits,
27 there would still be a welfare benefit associated with 
having the option of creating a new unit whether that option is exercised or not. 
8.  The mechanisms tend to optimize governmental units independently of how units are modeled, as 
shown below. 
 
Further advantages of the Erection Mechanism are as follows: 
9.  No a priori judgment by the citizens or anyone else is necessary, since the mechanism is self 
defining (a self defining referendum). It is selfdefining because it is the proposal itself that defines 
the boundaries of the proposed new unit, which implicitly defines who are the decision makers 
(voters). 
10. The mechanism is also self-limiting, and self-adjusting with respect to geographical size and 
population. If the proposed geographical size or population is too large or too small, the 
proposal will fail as the citizens will no longer believe it to be in their interest to vote in favor of 
                                                                 
25 Non-erection applies to the actual process. Non-erection means absence of erection. I.e., it applies to a unit 
that might have existed, but never was erected. Non-erection is thus distinct from abolishment which applies to 
an existing unit. More specifically, non-erection applies to men living in Hobbes’ (1651:chap. XIII-XIV) ”state of 
war”, without “natural laws” to govern them, thus not erecting a new unit, and not abolishing a unit since no unit 
exists. 
26 I.e., expanding the opportunities for peaceful voluntary unit creation or non-erection by itself increases welfare, 
if for no other reason than because of the expanded choice itself. 
27 Benefits would not be evident if the unit in question had perfect knowledge of each citizen’s preferences and  
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the proposal. Thus it is in the interests of the sponsors of the proposal to adjust the proposal to 
what they believe to be an optimum value. 
11. When optimizing with respect  to size, keeping the other variables constant, the Erection 
Mechanism makes possible moves to the global maximum of the welfare function, since the 
citizens do not have to pass through valleys between local maxima in cases when the welfare 
function is not single peaked. While the Adjustment Mechanism is gradual, i.e. citizen by citizen 
or lot by lot as far as territory goes, and thus moves you from one point to the next point 
adjoining on the welfare surface
28, the Erection Mechanism makes possible much more radical 
changes directly from one point on the surface to virtually any other point. 
29 
 
Further advantages of the Adjustment Mechanism are as follows: 
12. Adjustments at the edges give optimal size of government (local optimum). 
13. Adjustments at the edges give  local minimum for the cost function, or local maximum for 
corresponding welfare function. 
14. Adjustments in general involve fewer people and less territory and may be made to operate at a 
lower total cost than referenda. Adjustments, together with the option  of the  Erection 
Mechanism, provide an implied unanimity in the adherence to a governmental unit. 
15. Even if many factors like geography and resources influencing optimal size of government may 
remain fairly constant, others change, e.g. population, social factors, politics, and above all 
technology. 
 
Let us illustrate through four different lines of reasoning how the Erection, Adjustment, and Death 
mechanisms tend to optimize governmental units independently of how units are modeled. 
 
1. Let us use Coase’s model of government as a firm, described above. Firms emphasize minimizing 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
was perfectly responsive; a somewhat tall order. 
28 This discussion may seem unclear since each citizen’s welfare function has a component related to other 
citizens. When the population is large, the impact of a one-person population change on each of the other 
citizens is small, approaching zero as the population approaches infinity, but nevertheless facilitates an 
incremental move from one point on the welfare surface to the next adjoining point.  
29 Multipeaked utility functions may for instance come about as a consequence of possible shifts in technology. 
E.g., when sufficiently many citizens decide to move from a small to a large unit, it may e.g. at some point become 
feasible to build a new subway system or a new highway to increase welfare. This gives a peak at a low 
population/geographical  extent value, and another peak at a high population/geographical extent value that 
enables highway construction, while all intermediate points cause lower welfare.   
 
15
costs of production. Firms exist because there are costs associated with market transactions that 
may be eliminated by internalizing the allocation of resources. This internalization c reates 
administrative costs. For any given product or service the firm internalizes those functions where the 
administrative costs are lower than the corresponding transaction costs in order to optimize 
(minimize) the sum of costs per unit of output and thus maximize profits. If a firm fails to optimize its 
cost structure, it may go out of business as customers switch to substitutes from other lower cost 
firms. The market mechanism thus constrains the firm both on the input side (encouraging the firm to 
enter into market transactions for those inputs it cannot obtain at a lower cost internally) and on the 
output side since the price obtainable for its outputs are determined by the market. With the 
proposed mechanisms, governments will be similarly constrained on the output side. If a unit charges 
(through taxes or fees) substantially more for the same (or nearly the same) products and services as 
nearby units, it will find its borders closing in on it as its citizens migrate to other units either through 
the  Erection Mechanism or the Adjustment Mechanism. Thus, assuming the managers of 
governmental units would like to “stay in business”, they will have broadly the same incentive as 
“firm” managers in optimizing their cost structure. (Even if there’s no conscious effort on the part of 
unit managers as such, the end result will anyhow be that the low-cost producers will be the 
survivors.) 
 
2. The proposed model tends to optimize the size of units. Many typical local governmental tasks 
have a cost function that is size dependent. If the unit size (in terms of population or area) is too 
small, costs are high. Cost per unit then falls as size increases until a certain optimum, beyond which 
costs again rise. To the ultimate customer it doesn’t really matter whether the terms of the provided 
service is competitive because of optimal input selection according to point 1 above or because the 
governmental unit as such has an optimal size. But if size is non-optimal, an alternative governmental 
unit may become even more attractive by combining an optimum input selection with optimum size. 
Thus in a longterm equilibrium situation both size and the proper mix of internal and market 
transactions will be optimized. 
 
3. While the two lines of reasoning above is most readily applicable to typical local governmental 
functions, social, legal and cultural issues may often be more prevalent at higher levels of 
government. Historically, state erection has come about primarily because of social and cultural  
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issues rather than narrow economic considerations. The mechanisms are not, however, size 
dependent; they work equally well whether at the county, city or township level or at the state or 
national level. Neither are the proposed mechanisms dependent on the motivating factor whether it 
be narrow economic interests or cultural factors. The mechanisms are there to facilitate transactions, 
they don’t ask you why you want to transact. Consequently, the proposed mechanisms take into 
account not only what can be measured like the cost of services, but also those intangibles like 
religion, political system, and other social and cultural issues, that are subjectively important, but 
difficult to measure. The longterm equilibrium will be determined by all these factors, and thus may 
or may not coincide with the results obtainable through a more technocratic longterm cost function 
even if that could be constructed.
30 
 
4. The mechanisms may also be analyzed in terms of the unanimity criterion proposed by Wicksell 
(1896), extended by Buchanan and Tullock (1962). Buchanan and Tullock (1962:64) point out that 
the expected external costs to each citizen of collective decision making reaches zero when the 
decision requires unanimity. This is because “he will not willingly allow others to impose external 
costs on him when he can effectively prevent this from happening.” The proposed mechanism does 
not impose a unanimity criterion for all decisions, but it does in a sense require unanimity or very 
near unanimity, in the context of adherence to a particular territorial unit
31.
32 The reason is that any 
citizen may at any time propose the erection of a new unit, and a resident landowner may in fact 
decide as a single citizen whether a new unit should be erected. This adherence to a particular unit 
places definite constraints on the aggregate outcome of all decisions. The aggregate outcome must, 
taken as a whole, confer net benefits on all individuals within that unit. Furthermore, these benefits 
cannot be less than the benefits any other unit is capable of offering to that particular citizen, absent 
decision making and transaction costs, and assuming equivalent other costs. The implication, over 
time, is that Pareto optimal solutions are obtained where no citizen can be made better off without 
making somebody else worse off.  
                                                                 
30 The emphasis on facilitating market like transactions also eliminates the need for any (a priori) normative 
judgments about which factors “ought” to be included in any explicit optimization. Thus in a very real sense we 
bypass much of the current discussion regarding the size of units, optimal level of public goods provisioning, 
taxation etc. Once we leave these issues directly to the citizens, our own opinions become unimportant. 
31 If that territorial unit is a sovereign state we do in a sense impose this unanimity requirement on the 
constitutional makeup of that state as well. This can be made clearer by extending the second sentence of 
Assumption 2: “The draft shall describe the boundaries of the new state and its constitution.” 




Let us finally contemplate a few limitations. First, Frey (2001:170-171) contemplates whether 
citizens and consumers become overburdened in a direct democracy. We propose that mechanisms 
for voting can be adequately structured, applying the internet with the advent of electronic signatures. 
Frey proposes that “a governmental or a private advisory service can be established, which offers 
information and support for the consumers’ decisions.” 
 
Second, the mechanisms may create states that are economically inefficient in a narrow sense. The 
response is that this doesn’t really matter. Narrow economic efficiency may not be what the 
population wants; i.e. it is the subjective welfare of each citizen that counts, not an outside observers 
opinion on what t he welfare preferences of the participants ought to look like. Citizens may 
legitimately trade monetary income for other intangible subjective benefits. 
 
Third, the mechanisms may create states that are non-contiguous and thereby dysfunctional. The 
response is that yes, states may be non-contiguous. However, whether such a state is necessarily 
dysfunctional is a question that has to be answered not by economists or outside observers, but by 
the citizens, which constitute the group that is most directly involved. This is something the 
population would have to consider in their voting. 
 
Fourth, the mechanisms may impose costs on parties outside the proposed borders, e.g. people 
suddenly finding that they are located on a border instead of in the middle of a country. This is a 
general problem, any real consumption or investment decision influences other people. It is only in 
the idealized world of perfect markets that externalities do not exist. If I decide to move my grocery 
purchases elsewhere, my current supplier may go out of business and his employees become 
unemployed. Does this mean that I should be restricted in my choice of where to buy my groceries? 
The externalities we impose are in many respects needed to get the market mechanism and an 
efficient resource allocation to function. If our grocery supplier loses customers this provides him 
with the information he needs to either enhance his product, or, if he goes out of business, releases 
resources that can be put to better use elsewhere. The real question is not between the mechanisms 
proposed in this article and a perfect world, but between the mechanisms and the state of affairs as 




they are today, or between the mechanisms and other less than perfect mechanisms. 
 
6 Conclusion 
The article suggests a constitutional model attempting to remedy shortcomings of the contemporary 
constitutional models, at the local, national, or super national levels. Rather than focusing on a 
narrow model with restrictive and specialized assumptions, and subsequent solutions, as has been 
common in the literature, the article proposes straightforward and simple Erection, Adjustment, and 
Death mechanisms for governmental units, giving autonomy to each citizen as in a direct democracy. 
Realizing that citizens are themselves best equipped to find their own solutions, the emphasis is on 
the practical approach of how citizens discover and implement their subjective preferences. 
 
The article subjects governmental units to some of the same market forces as ordinary firms, in the 
spirit of Coase (1988). This brings the interaction between governmental units closer to a market 
structure, and serves to eliminate or reduce many of the coercive elements of government. Creating 
a more market like structure reduces or eliminates the need for normative or a priori judgments 
about the optimum size of units, optimum provision of goods and services, optimum level of taxation, 
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